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The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi
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This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world.
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Relations Without Forms: Some Consequences of Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Relations
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This article presents a new interpretation and critique of some aspects of Aquinas’s metaphysics of relations, with special reference to a theological problem—the relation of God to creatures—that catalyzed Aquinas’s and much medieval thought on the ontology of relations. I will show that Aquinas’s ontologically reductive theory of categorical real relations should equip him to identify certain relations as real relations, which he actually identifies as relations of reason, most notably the relation of God to creatures.
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Are the Father and Son Different in Kind? Scotus and Ockham on Different Kinds of Things, Univocal and Equivocal Production, and Subordination in the Trinity
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In this paper, I examine how Scotus and Ockham try to solve the following problem. If different kinds of constituents contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute, then the divine Father and Son should be different in kind because they are constituted by at least some constituents that are different in kind (namely, fatherhood and sonship). However, if the Father and Son are different in kind, the Son’s production will be equivocal, and equivocal products are typically less perfect than their producers. Therefore, the Son must be subordinate to the Father. In response, Scotus argues that different kinds of constituents do not necessarily result in different kinds of things, but Ockham rejects this, arguing instead that although the Father and Son are different in kind, they are still equal in perfection because of their identity with the divine essence.
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Knowing Lions and Understanding “Lion”: Two Jobs for Concepts in Ockham?
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Externalist readings of Ockham are currently most prominent in the literature. For instance, an externalist interpretation with respect both to mental content and the meaning of expressions is advocated by prominent scholars. In this paper, I want to argue that although this externalist picture is certainly not incorrect, it is nonetheless incomplete. As I show, Ockham distinguishes between two ways of acquiring concepts: one of them can be accounted for in wholly externalist terms while the other involves the understanding of linguistic expressions. According to the reading of Ockham I suggest here, it turns out that we can have two kinds of concepts pertaining to the same kind of things. But only one of the two is completely determined by external relations. Thus I conclude that the externalist picture of Ockham calls for some additions.
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A Possible Trace of Oresme’s Condicio-Theory of Accidents in an Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology
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In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Nicole Oresme (c. 1320-1382) propounds a very specific theory of the ontological status of accidents. Characteristic of Oresme’s view on accidents is that he does not consider them accidental forms, but only so-called condiciones or modi of the substance. Unlike the term “modus”, the term “condicio” seems to be very characteristic of Oresme’s own terminology. Up to now it has been unknown whether Oresme exerted any influence with his condicio-theory of accidents. This paper presents an anonymous 14th-century commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 4375, ff. 19r-46v), in two Questions of which the term “condicio” occurs in an ontological context. Moreover, the text shows further striking coincidences with known works by Oresme, and this makes an influence by Oresme appear all the more probable.
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A further Note on ‘Peter of Spain’
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