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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition
Volumes & issues:
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Plotinus on the Making of Matter Part II: ‘A Corpse Adorned’ (Enn. II 4 [12] 5.18)
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- Soul springs from Intellect, Intellect springs from the One. But quite how does the sensible world arise? A pair of almost successive treatises (III 9 [13] 3 and III 4 [15] 1) points to the answer. A lower manifestation of soul ‘makes’ or ‘gives birth to’ what is variously described as ‘non-being’, ‘utterly indefinite’ and ‘utterly dark’, before covering what she has made with form, specifically the form of ‘body’, and before ‘entering rejoicing’ into the object that, by its reception of form, has been made ready to receive her and that, as the ‘dwelling place’ of soul, will be none other than the visible cosmos. A pair of earlier, again almost successive treatises, spells out the implication. The matter of the sensible world, covered with at least a minimum of form, is described as a ‘corpse adorned’ (II 4 [12] 5). The same object, but prior to its ‘adornment’, prior therefore to its appearance as a ‘body’ that is a ‘corpse’, and prior to any ‘indwelling’ of soul, is specifically said to be ‘non-being’ and the ‘darkness of matter’ (V 1 [10] 2), a transparent allusion to the product of soul in the two later treatises. The soul’s making of ‘darkness’, so we may infer, is a making of ‘matter’, the final act in the drama by which everything that exists, including the material substrate of the world we see and feel around us, stems ultimately from the One.
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Apprehension of Thought in Ennead 4.3.30
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- Plotinus maintains that our intellect is always thinking. This is due to his view that our intellect remains in the intelligible world and shares a natural kinship with the hypostasis Intellect, whose being and activity consists in eternal contemplation of the Forms. Moreover, Plotinus maintains that although our intellect is always thinking we do not always apprehend our thoughts. This is due to his view that “we” descend into the sensible world while our intellect remains in the intelligible world. Furthermore, Plotinus maintains that it is only when logoi unfold the content of our thoughts into the imagination that we apprehend them. This is due to a complex account between, on the one hand, the relationship between intellect and discursive reasoning, and on the other hand, the relationship between discursive reasoning and language. Plotinus tells this story with remarkable brevity in Ennead 4.3.30. In this paper I explain the role the imagination plays in the apprehension of thoughts through a close analysis of this treatise in connection with Ennead 1.4.10.
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Philo of Alexandria’s Use of Sleep and Dreaming as Epistemological Metaphors in Relation to Joseph
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- Dreams are used figuratively throughout Greek literature to refer to something fleeting and/or unreal. In Plato, this metaphorical language is specifically used to describe an epistemological distinction: the one who has false knowledge or opinion is said to be dreaming while the one who has true knowledge is said to be awake. These figures are also central to Philo of Alexandria’s philosophical language in De somniis 1-2 and De Iosepho. Although scholars have documented these epistemological metaphors in Plato and related treatments of the concept of sleep in Heraclitus, it has not been discussed in any detail in relation to Philo’s treatment of Joseph in these two treatises. In De somniis 1-2, Philo primarily emphasizes his role as a dreamer and thus one incapable of true knowledge. In De Iosepho, Joseph is a dream interpreter who is not only awake but also capable of interpreting the figurative dream of life to which most people are subject. Although some scholars have considered these treatises contradictory in terms of their treatments of Joseph, an analysis of Philo’s figurative use of sleep and dreaming reveals that they are a part of a coherent exegetical framework.
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