Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Implied Contract and the Taxonomy of Unjust Enrichment

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this chapter

+ Tax (if applicable)

Chapter Summary

This chapter focuses on the critique of the grid. It acknowledges that some of the criticisms levelled against the grid and the methodology it implies are sound. It looks at the critique raised against the Birksian grid and Birks' use of it as an analytical tool from which answers about the law can be inferred. The chapter concentrates on the developed theoretical attack of Geoffrey Samuel, but Hedley has made much the same point in a less overtly jurisprudential manner. It analyses the grid from a Dworkinian perspective; Birks' views sit within a Dworkinian framework. The second part of the chapter demonstrates that Hedley's implied contract theory impacts unhelpfully on the taxonomy; and that the theory does not provide a coherent category and Hedley's critique of unjust enrichment lawyers' view of contract as based on consent fails to prove its point.

Keywords: Birksian grid; contract theory; Dworkinian framework; Geoffrey Samuel; Hedley; unjust enrichment lawyers



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation