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Enforcement Measures

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Chapter Summary

The credibility of the reorganisation system for sovereign debt (RSSD) is closely connected with its ability to protect the parties against uncooperative behaviour by other parties and to enforce solutions obtained in the reorganisation process. Automatic standstill and rules providing for majority voting are valuable tools against disruptive litigation by creditors. However, these devices do not tackle the problem of uncooperative debtor behaviour. For instance, since Argentina defaulted on its debt in December 2001, private bondholders tried in vain, to negotiate a reasonable solution of the case. While Argentina is an example of a recalcitrant sovereign debtor, the problem is neither new, nor does it seem that likely that it will not occur in other sovereign debtor-creditor relations. This chapter therefore summarises the tools available under domestic private law as well as public international law to sanction such un-cooperative behaviour.

Keywords: domestic private law; private bondholders; public international law; recalcitrant sovereign debtor; reorganisation system for sovereign debt (RSSD); un-cooperative behaviour

10.1163/ej.9789004162471.i-312.31
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