Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Reply To Bo Mou

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this chapter

+ Tax (if applicable)

Chapter Summary

This chapter begins with the author mentioning two possible areas of disagreement with Bo Mou. First it seems to the author that he sometimes talks as if "transcendental perspectivalism" would enable consciousness to rise above all perspectives and thus dispense with aspectual shape. A second possible misunderstanding is where he suggests that there is a "tension" in his view about the relationships of science and philosophy. Some philosophers suppose that the truth of conceptual relativism implies that there is no real world, that they are constantly inventing the real world. What about perspectivalism and aspectual shape? All intentionality has aspectual shape. That just means that all representation is under an aspect, and there is nothing necessarily phenomenological about the notion of representation.

Keywords: Bo Mou; conceptual relativism; transcendental perspectivalism



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation