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Reply To Joel W. Krueger

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Chapter Summary

Professor Joel W. Krueger offers a criticism of the author's account of intentionality of action which, as he recognizes, echoes certain criticisms of the author by phenomenologists. Before answering his objections, the author, in this chapter, states how he interprets the notion of wu-wei. The argument that both the prior intention and the intention-inaction must have conditions of satisfaction is a purely logical argument. The author thinks that a lot of the phenomenology is misdescribed. Consider for instance Dreyfus's example of the tennis player who fails to achieve a satisfactory gestalt. The phenomenological illusion involves two halves. One: if it is phenomenologically real, it is real, that is all the reality you need. Second, if it is not phenomenologically real, it is not real at all. Phenomenologists have difficulty in describing that fact, because though it is intentional behavior it is done quite automatically and unreflectively.

Keywords: Joel W. Krueger; phenomenologists; wu-wei



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