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Searle, De Re Belief, And The Chinese Language

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Chapter Summary

Searle, for one, takes a rather parsimonious approach to the matter, indeed a commendable one in the face of what otherwise amounts to a steaming jungle of confusing explications. He thinks of de re beliefs as nothing more than a special subclass of de dicto ones. It is important to note that here the author assuming, along with Searle, that the intentionality of language is parasitic on the intentionality of mind, and thus that linguistic meaning must in some way answer to broader, more inclusive notions of meaning and representational content. The author wishes to make is potentially of interest not only to philosophers of mind and language generally, but also specifically to those whose interest it is to procure more grist for the semantic irrealist's mill. The author can easily see someone exploiting the conclusion he wishes to draw to make a case for skepticism about semantical notions.

Keywords: Chinese Language; de dicto ones; de re beliefs; Searle; semantical notions; skepticism



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