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Nominales and rules of inference

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Chapter Summary

Among the positions attributed to the Nominales in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries are several that can be categorized as rules of inference or are related to theories of entailment. The Nominalist positions concerned with inference, and in particular the third rule and its variation, provide just such an opportunity for testing the Abelardian origin of some of the opiniones Nominalium and their relation to the positions of other twelfth-century schools. The first position, namely that a "syllogism does not require a topical justification", is a statement about certain types of inferences. The second position that a negative does not follow from an affirmative is attributed to the Nominales in a fragment of a twelfth-century logical treatise.

Keywords: Abelard; Nominales; opiniones Nominalium; syllogistic inference



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