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In this chapter, members of the CCP can experience a suspension of legal rights regardless of their status or political clout. This outcome can be explained by institutional and quasi-legal variables: the CCP investigative powers are parallel to the powers of judicial organs. Historical continuities exist between shuanggui and earlier forms of extra-legal detention. Each of these measures found its rationale in the need to isolate and neutralize those whose behaviors posed a threat to party ideology in the Mao era and to its governing capability and moral legitimacy in the reform period. Seen from this perspective, the concrete efforts of the party-state to limit, centralize, and regulate the use of shuanggui turned what was initially conceived as a temporary measure into a normal component of the legal system. China's ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has resulted in the criminalization of trading in influence.
Keywords: (UNCAC); china; judicial organs; quasi-legal variables; SHUANGGUI