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The Foundations Of A Post-Foundational Ethics

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Chapter Summary

The problem of radically groundless ethical action is a central concern of an increasing number of philosophers in the last few centuries. This chapter discusses Foucaults claim, which bears the strong influence of both Nietzsche and Sartre. In this suggestion, we find neatly encapsulated the apparent contradiction that lies at the very heart of the central issue to this book, which the author has attempted to capture in the terms used by Simone Beauvoir, but which run right through Existentialist thought: those of absurdity and responsibility. The idea of ethics and the root of the apparent contradiction lies in the need to justify that action. The fundamental problematic of post-foundational ethics, is contra Rorty very much based upon a set of assumptions about the ontological nature of the human condition. The chapter unpacks what some of the implications of these foundational assumptions might be.

Keywords: ethical principles; post-foundationalism



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