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Prolegomena to a Structural Account of Belief and Other Attitudes

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Chapter Summary

Theories that analyze belief as a relation between the believer and a set of possible worlds are unacceptable in just this way. In a context where beliefs are attributed for the sake of explaining overt behavior their intentional character would thus appear to be of paramount importance. What is needed therefore is a theory of belief which does justice both to (i) the intentionality of beliefs and (ii) to the fact that their identity conditions are stricter than those of the corresponding sets of worlds. The general strategy is to see an attitude reporting sentence, in the spirit of discourse representation theory (DRT), as a set of instructions to the recipient for constructing a representation of the reported attitude.

Keywords:attitudes; belief; DRT; sentences; structural account



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