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8 The Heart of Metaphysical Pluralism and the Consistency Dilemma: A Critical Analysis of the Possibility of Incompatible Truths

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Chapter Summary

This chapter critically considers how Michael P. Lynch and Terry Horgan together with Mark Timmons have sought to make sense of the possibility of incompatible but true propositions, especially with regard to one key criticism of it, sometimes and appropriately called the consistency dilemma. It describes some basic features of Lynch's position, metaphysical pluralism, and his own preferred account of concepts, which constitutes an essential part of his argument for metaphysical pluralism. The chapter looks at the core idea of this kind of pluralism, the possibility of incompatible and true propositions. It argues that Lynch's analysis of this possibility is somewhat unsatisfactory in that it only makes sense relative to a certain, somewhat questionable, account of concepts and in what sense two propositions can be true yet incompatible. The chapter considers a proposal presented by Horgan and Timmons. Horgan and Timmons are in the business of explaining conceptual relativity.

Keywords: conceptual relativity; consistency dilemma; Mark Timmons; metaphysical pluralism; Michael P. Lynch; Terry Horgan

10.1163/9789004270183_010
/content/books/b9789004270183_010
dcterms_subject,pub_keyword
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