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COMPARISON: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE INEVITABLE

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Schema theory and other facets of the cognitive sciences remind us that certain of the intellectual processes of the human brain are crucially comparative. In that comparison is ineluctable in monitoring the world and in coming to understand newly encountered events, then perhaps we can consciously improve on what is cognitively inevitable. It is suggested here that if we deliberately move from what the philosopher H.H. Price calls "the Philosophy of Universals" to what he terms "the Philosophy of Resemblances," our comparisons are likely to become more realistic, both existentially and cognitively. Further, in applying the Philosophy of Resemblances in both cross-cultural and cross-species comparisons, we may better tame the ethnocentric language of the former and the anthropocentric language of the latter in their respective efforts to transcend conceptualized boundaries in order to make comparisons.

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/content/journals/10.1163/156852701752245569
2001-07-01
2016-08-30

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