Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Full Access Towards a Reassessment of British Aristotelianism*

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the Brill platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. MyBook is a cheap paperback edition of the original book and will be sold at uniform, low price.

Towards a Reassessment of British Aristotelianism*

Full text article:

  • PDF
  • XML
  • HTML
Add to Favorites

image of Vivarium

Abstract The aim of the paper is to reassess the role of British Aristotelianism within the history of early modern logic between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a crucial moment of cultural transition from the model of humanistic rhetoric and dialectic to that of facultative logic, that is, a logic which concerns the study of the cognitive powers of the mind. The paper shows that there is a special connection between Paduan Aristotelianism and British empiricism, through the mediation of British Aristotelianism. British Aristotelians took the ideas of the Paduan Aristotelian tradition and carried them to an extreme, gradually removing them from the original Aristotelian context in which they were grounded and developing what would later become the fundamental ideas of British empiricism.

1. FN0*) The title of this paper is inspired by the famous article of Charles B. Schmitt, ‘Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism’, History of Science 11 (1970): 159-193. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Charles B. Schmitt on the 25th anniversary of his premature death. This research has been possible thanks to a Frances A. Yates Fellowship at The Warburg Institute. I am grateful to Enrico Berti, Constance Blackwell, Charles Burnett, Stephen Clucas, Guido Giglioni, Jill Kraye, Howard Hotson, Sarah Hutton, Per Landgren, Peter Mack, Elizabeth A. Moyer, Gregorio Piaia and Riccardo Pozzo for their comments and suggestions.
2. FN11) See John H. Randall, ‘The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua’, Journal of the History of Ideas 1 (1940): 177-206.
3. FN22) On the problem of the ‘continuity’ between Paduan Aristotelianism and modern science see Alexandre Koyré, ‘Galileo and Plato’, Journal of the History of Ideas 5 (1943): 400-428; Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York-London: Columbia University Press, 1960), XIII-XVI; Eugenio Garin, ‘Gli umanisti e la scienza’, Rivista di filosofia 52 (1961): 259-278; Neal W. Gilbert, ‘Galileo and the School of Padua’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1-2 (1963): 223-231; Eugenio Garin, Scienza e vita civile nel Rinascimento italiano (Roma-Bari: Laterza 1965); Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Aristotelianism and Its Fate: Some Observations and Problems, in John P. Anton (ed.), Naturalism and Historical Understanding. Essays on the Philosophy of John Hermann Randall (Albany: University of New York Press, 1967), 42-52; Charles B. Schmitt, Aristotelianism in the Veneto and the Origins of Modern Science: Some Considerations on the Problem of Continuity, in Luigi Olivieri (ed.), Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna (Padua: Antenore, 1983), 104-124. On the problem of the unity of the ‘Paduan Aristotelianism’ see Cesare Vasoli, Su alcuni problemi e discussioni logiche del Cinquecento italiano, in Id., Studi sulla cultura del Rinascimento (Manduria: Laicata, 1968), 257-344; Charles B. Schmitt, A Critical Survey and Bibliography of Studies on Renaissance Aristotelianism 1958-1969 (Padova: Antenore, 1971), 38-46.
4. FN33) William F. Edwards, Paduan Aristotelianism and the Origins of Modern Theories of Methods, in Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna, ed. by Luigi Olivieri, (Padua: Antenore, 1983), 206. I agree with Edwards’s thesis that the question of ‘continuity’ must be understood in relation to empiricism and to the theory of method rather than to modern science.
5. FN44) On this topic see the insightful remarks of Paolo Rossi in his ‘Aristotelici e moderni: le ipotesi e la natura’, in Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna, 142.
6. FN55) There are some good studies of the impact of Aristotelianism on authors such as Hobbes and Locke, but they are confined to natural philosophy, see for instance, Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanization of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’s Natural Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
7. FN66) See Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts. Bd. 3. England, ed. by Jean-Pierre Schobinger (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1988), 6-25.
8. FN77) Only a few references can be found in Gabriel Nuchelmans, ‘Logic in the seventeenth century: Preliminary Remarks and the Constituents of the Proposition’, in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. by Dan Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 103-117.
9. FN88) On humanistic logic see Lisa Jardine, ‘Humanistic Logic’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner and Eckhard Kessler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 173-198; Peter Mack, ‘Humanistic Rhetoric and Dialectic’, in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed by. Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82-99. On ‘facultative logic’ see James G. Buickerood, ‘The Natural History of the Understanding: Locke and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century’, History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1985): 157-190.
10. FN99) Neal W. Gilbert, ‘Galileo and the School of Padua’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 1-2 (1963): 227.
11. FN1010) For a general overview of Zabarella’s theory of science see Antonino Poppi, La dottrina della scienza in Giacomo Zabarella (Padova: Antenore, 1972); Heikki Mikkeli, An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism. Jacopo Zabarella on the nature of arts and sciences (Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandiae, 1992).
12. FN1111) Cf. Antonino Poppi, Introduzione all’aristotelismo padovano (Padova: Antenore, 1991 2ed.), 14.
13. FN1212) Jacopo Zabarella, Opera logica (Köln: Zetzner, 1597), 21 A.
14. FN1313) Ibid., 6 A-C.
15. FN1414) Ibid., 502 E-F. See Riccardo Pozzo, ‘Res considerata and modus considerandi rem: Averroes, Aquinas, Jacopo Zabarella and Cornelius Martini on Reduplication’, Medioevo 24 (1998): 151-176.
16. FN1515) Zabarella devoted an entire book, De tribus praecognitis, to the study of the praecognita; see Zabarella, Opera logica, 498 E-530 C.
17. FN1616) Ibid., 1263 C.
18. FN1717) Zabarella, Opera logica, 505 A-506 B.
19. FN1818) Ibid., 663 F-666 A. On this distinction see Wilhelm Risse, Zabarellas Methodenlehre, in Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna, 155-172.
20. FN1919) Ibid., 224 E-255A. See alsop Jacopo Zabarella, Opera physica (Verona: Aemme, 2009), 7.
21. FN2020) Ibid., 54 C-D.
22. FN2121) Zabarella devoted an entire book, De sensu agente, to sensation as an active faculty of the mind; see Jacopo Zabarella, De rebus naturalibus libri triginta (Köln: Zetzner, 1590), 754-774.
23. FN2222) Ibid., 485 D-E.
24. FN2323) According to Zabarella, there are two forms of resolutio. The first is demonstration from effect (ab effectu, quia), which can enable the mind to discover objects that are obscure and hidden, while the second form is demonstrative induction, that is, reasoning from particular facts or effects to a general principle.
25. FN2424) Ibid., 481 A-C, 489 D-E.
26. FN2525) See Charles B. Schmitt, ‘Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella’s View with Galileo’s in De Motu’, Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969): 80-138, esp. p. 106. For a full account of Zabarella’s empiricism see Gabriele Baroncini, Forme di esperienza e rivoluzione scientifica (Firenze: Olschki, 1992), 39-62.
27. FN2626) Zabarella, Opera logica, 1269 E-1270 B.
28. FN2727) Ibid., 1271 C-D.
29. FN2828) Baroncini finds evidence of the use of experience in Zabarella as a means of refuting general principles, from a quasi-experimental standpoint, in the commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, see Zabarella, Opera physica, 525.
30. FN2929) On the decline of logic in early modern England, see Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 25; Earline J. Ashworth, ‘Introduction’, in Robert Sanderson, Logices artis compendium (Bologna: CLEUB, 1985), XXIII.
31. FN3030) See Wilburn S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England 1500-1700 (New York: Russell, 1961 2nd ed.).
32. FN3131) Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. by William Molesworth (London: Bohn, 1839), 3:670.
33. FN3232) Mordechai Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, in The History of the University of Oxford. Seventeenth-Century Oxford, ed. by Nicholas Tycke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 276-277.
34. FN3333) Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 6.
35. FN3434) See Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis, ed. by Strickland Gibson (Oxford: Calarendon University Press, 1931), 437: ‘Praeterea cum authorum varietas multas peperisset in scholis dissentiones, statuerunt vel Aristotelem secundum vetera et laudabilia universitatis statuta, vel alios authores secundum Aristotelem defendendos esse, omnesque steriles et inanes quaestiones ab antiqua et vera philosophia dissidentes, a scholis excludendas et exterminandas’. See Earline J. Ashworth, ‘Die philosophischen Lehrstätten. 1. Oxford’, in Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts. Bd. 3. England, 6-9.
36. FN3535) On the importance of the statues, see Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 43: ‘an Aristotelian revival during the final quarter of the sixteenth century . . . was possible within the existing statutes [i.e., of 1586]. This revival represents a turning away from the language arts of the humanists back to the solid scientia of the Stagirite’.
37. FN3636) For the dissemination of Zabarella in Oxford see Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, 221-358; and for his dissemination in Scottish universities see Christine M. King, Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the 17th century, University of Edinburgh, PhD dissertation 1975, 61-111. See also my paper ‘La presenza dell’aristotelismo padovano in Gran Bretagna (1589-1689)’, in Nuovi Maestri e antichi testi: Umanesimo e Rinascimento alle Origini del Pensiero Moderno, ed. by Stefano Caroti and Vittoria Perrone Compagni, (Firenze: Olschki, 2012), forthcoming.
38. FN3737) William A. Wright (ed.), English Works of Roger Ascham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 277-278.
39. FN3838) See Richard Stanyhurst, Harmonia seu catena dialectica in Porphyrianas institutiones (London: Wolf, 1570), table of authors.
40. FN3939) See Everard Digby, Theoria analytica (London: Bynneman, 1579); Everard Digby, De duplici methodo libri duo (London: Bynneman, 1580).
41. FN4040) Digby, De duplici methodo libri duo, b.1, ch. 16.
42. FN4141) Ibid., b.1, ch. 19.
43. FN4242) Ibid., b.1, ch. 26.
44. FN4343) Ibid., b.1, ch. 27.
45. FN4444) Ibid., b. 1, ch. 30.
46. FN4545) Ibid., b.1, ch. 36: ‘Sensus est initium notitiae nobis prioris. . . . Quem quidem primae abstractionis notitiaeque esse initium. . . . Si nullum in nobis naturale est principium iudicandi, neque artificiose quicquam poterimus invenire; sin tale inveniatur in natura, in arte utique confirmabitur. Assero omnes habere naturalia iudicia . . . ex multis sensibus, fieri experientiam: experientiis, memoriam, memoriis, scientiam. . . . actio prima ab obiecto ad sensum, per hunc ad intellectum ascendit’.
47. FN4646) Ibid., b. 1, ch. 51.
48. FN4747) William Temple, Admonitio de unica P. Rami methodo reiectis caeteris retinenda (London: Mann, 1580), 70: ‘statuendum quae natura notiora sunt, eadem ipsa esse nobis notiora’.
49. FN4848) In his response to the Ramist William Temple, Digby elaborates his empiricist account based on sensation and induction, see Everard Digby, Admonitioni F. Mildapetti Navareni de unica P. Rami methodo retinenda, responsio (London: Bynnemann 1580), preface.
50. FN4949) Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 35.
51. FN5050) Charles B. Schmitt, ‘John Case on Art and Nature’, Annals of Science 33 (1976): 543.
52. FN5151) See John Case, Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam Aristotelis (London: Vautrollier, 1584). The book was printed in 1584, in 1592 and in 1598.
53. FN5252) Ibid., 120.
54. FN5353) Ibid.
55. FN5454) Ibid: ‘Omnis intellective cognitio, sive complexa, sive incomplex sit, oritur a sensu, vel 1) directe recipiendo species, ut in obiectis rerum corporearum, quae vi sua pulsant moventque sensum; 2) indirecte per lucem et acumen intellectus agentis, qui ex corporeis formis a sensu ad se translatas saepe res incorporeas percipit’.
56. FN5555) Ibid., 120-121.
57. FN5656) Ibid., 121.
58. FN5757) Ibid., 128.
59. FN5858) Case is the only British logician of the time to distinguish intellection from induction. Intellection was often confused with the process of induction or with demonstrative induction.
60. FN5959) Ibid., 134.
61. FN6060) Ibid., 134-135.
62. FN6161) Ibid., 135.
63. FN6262) John Case, Lapis philosophicus (Oxford: Barnes, 1599), 36.
64. FN6363) Ibid., 34.
65. FN6464) Ibid., 38.
66. FN6565) See Aristotle, Organum, ed and transl. Giulio Pace (Morges: Laimarie, 1584).
67. FN6666) Giulio Pace, In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum commentarius analyticus (Frankfurt: Wechel, 1597).
68. FN6767) Giulio Pace, Institutiones logicae (Cambridge: Legat, 1597). The first edition was published in Sedan in 1595.
69. FN6868) Giulio Pace, Logicae rudimenta (London: Stansby, 1612). The first edition was published in Spira in 1610.
70. FN6969) Griffith Powell, Analysis Analyticorum posteriorum sive librorum Aristotelis de demonstratione (Oxford: Barnes, 1594), front-matter. The commentary was republished in 1631.
71. FN7070) Ibid., 338-339: ‘Et haec nullam habent cognitionem praeter cognitionem sensus, quam in ipso sentiendi actu tantum acquirunt. Nam nihil cognoscunt, nisi cum sentient, cum illa rei etiam absentis cognitionem habeant. Deinde animalia, quae memoriam habent, non unius sunt generis. Nam quaedam rationem, quae similes rerum sensilium conceptus inter se componit, et universale ex illis colligit habent: ut homo quaedam non habent: ut caetera bruta animantia. Haec cognitionem tantum singularem: ille etiam universalem habet: Unde in homine ex sensu, sive ex sensatione sit memoria: ex memoria saepe rei eiusdem (non numero sed specie) facta sit experientia: siquidem multae memoriae numero unam experientiam constituunt: ex experientis, sive ex omni universali quiescente in anima, nimirum uno praeter multa, quod in omnibus est unus et idem, sit artis et scientiae principium: artis si pertineat ad generationem; scientiae, si pertineat ad id quod est, sive quod iam existit’.
72. FN7171) Ibid., 340.
73. FN7272) Ibid., 340.
74. FN7373) On the impact of Zabarella on Keckermann, Scheibler and Burgersdijk see Ulrich G. Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik (Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985), 271-287, 322-324; Mordechai Feingold, ‘The Ultimate Pedagogue: Franco Petri Burgersdijk and the English Speaking Academic Learning’, in Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635). Neo-Aristotelianism in Leiden, ed. by Egbert P. Bos and Henri A. Krop (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), 151-165.
75. FN7474) See Samuel Smith, Aditus ad logicam (London: Stansby, 1613). This handbook went through eleven editions in eighty years in London and in Oxford (1613, 1615, 1617, 1618, 1621, 1627, 1633, 1634, 1639, 1649, 1656, 1684).
76. FN7575) Ibid., 116-119.
77. FN7676) See John P. McCaskey, Regula Socratis. The Rediscovery of Ancient Induction in Early Modern England (Stanford: PhD, 2006), 145-178. I agree with McCaskey’s argument that induction must not be confused with the resolutive method. I do not believe, however, that it plays an unimportant role in the regressive method, just because its two constituent parts are the demonstration ab effectu and the demonstration propter quid: in fact, induction is the only way to discover the principles of any demonstration, including the demonstration ab effectu, which constituted the resolutive part of the regressus.
78. FN7777) Ibid., 120: ‘Inductio est proprium instrumentum, quo principia scientiarum quae per se nota dicuntur nobis innotescunt’.
79. FN7878) Ibid.
80. FN7979) Ibid., 120-121.
81. FN8080) See Robert Sanderson, Logicae artis compendium (Oxford: Lichfield, 1618 2ed.). The companion was particularly widespread and it went through fourteen editions (1615, 1618, 1631, 1640, 1657, 1664, 1668, 1672, 1680, 1700, 1705, 1707, 1741, 1841).
82. FN8181) On Sanderson’s Zabarellism see Ashworth, ‘Introduction’, XXXV-LIV.
83. FN8282) Ibid., 225-226.
84. FN8383) Ibid., 226-227: ‘Methodi Inventionis quatuor sunt Media et velut gradus per quos ascendimus. Primus Sensus est; cujus adminiculo colligimus aliquam singularis rei notitiam; secundus Observatio, sive Historia; qua colligimus, et mente collocamus, quae sensu aliquoties hausimus; tertius Experientia; qua collectas plures observationes ad certum usum applicamus; quartus et ultimus Inductio, qua collectas plures Experientias ad universalem conclusione constituendam adhibemus’.
85. FN8484) John Flavell, Tractatus de demonstratione methodicus et polemicus (Oxford: Lichfield-Short, 1619). The treatise was reprinted at least three times in 1619, 1624, and 1651. The 1651 edition may have had some impact on the last draft of the Thomas Hobbes’s sixth chapter on method in his Logica, since this part was completely modified from the earlier version of the 1640s.
86. FN8585) Ibid., 2, 13.
87. FN8686) Ibid., 2, 107-108.
88. FN8787) Ibid., 2, 108-109: ‘Primam, omnis scientia conclusionis, quae habetur per demonstrationem, dependet a cognitione priincipiorum, quae ut supra asservimus, habetur per inductionem: atqui inductio ex singularibus notis sumitur, et nota haec esse nisi per sensum non possunt. Secundo, omnis cognitio intellectiva oritur ex praecedente cognitione: non autem ex praecedente cognitione intellectiva (ita enim daretur processus in infinitum) ergo praecedente sensitiva. Tertio, nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuit in sensu’. See Paul F. Cranefield, ‘On the Origin of the Phrase “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu”’, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 25 (1970): 77–80.
89. FN8888) Ibid., 2, 109: ‘Quod ad alterum spectat, de hoc vel illo sensu deficiente, et de objecto hujus vel illius sensus, res est aeque dilucida. Nam primo, cum confirmatum sit, sine sensu prorsus non esse scientiam, et cum res ista ab uno tantum sensu percipi posit, necesse est sublato uno illo sensu tolli universam ejus rei scientiam. Secundo, cecus non potest dijudicare de coloribus, surdus de sonis, et sic de ceteris: ergo neque eosdem perfecte cognoscunt’.
90. FN8989) Ibid., 2, 48.
91. FN9090) Ibid., 2, 48-49: Hoc ratione etiam dilucide constat: quia cum naturaliter non fiat transitus ab uno extremo in alterum, nisi per medium; fieri non potest, ut homines consueto naturae modo assentiantur principiis, antequam eorum habeant experientiam in plaerisque singularibus. Nam inter judicium unius singularis propositionis, et judicium universalis principii, medium est experimentum. Etenim judicium singularis propositionis uni tantum singulari addictum est: judicium vero universalis ad infinita diffunditur: at experimentum nec est unius tantum rei singularis, nec omnium, sed quorundam’.
92. FN9191) Ibid., 2, 49: ‘Secundo, omnis cognitio intellectualis a sensitiva originem ducit; nihilque est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu: hoc est, quod non fuerit sensu perceptum, vel per se, ut colores; vel per suas partes, ut mons aureus, et caetera quae fingimus; vel per sua effecta, ut Deus Opt. Max. et substantiae separatae, et virtutes rerum naturalium nostris sensibus occultae; vel per aliquid sibi simile, ut absentes et defuncti per depictas eorum imagines; vel per opposita, ut aspera, per levia, tenebrae per lumen; vel per sua fundamenta, ut secundae intensiones per res substratas seu denominatas; vel aliquo alio modo. Ergo principiorum omnium, etiam primorum, assensus non ex nuda apprehensione terminorum, sed ex alia sensitiva cognitione emanabit’.
93. FN9292) Ibid., 2, 51.
94. FN9393) Ibid., 2, 138.
95. FN9494) See Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 36.
96. FN9595) In the Novum organum, Bacon was probably arguing directly against Sanderson and Flavell. His ‘unfair’ criticism of British Aristotelians is particularly evident in paragraph LXIX of the first book; see Francis Bacon, Novum organum (London: Bill, 1620), 80-81.
97. FN9696) On Bacon’s Aristotelianism see Robert E. Larsen, ‘The Aristotelianism of Bacon’s Novum Organum’, Journal of the History of Ideas 4 (1962): 435-450; Louis A. Kosman, The Aristotelian Backgrounds of Bacon’s Novum Organum (Harvard: Ph.D., 1964).
98. FN9797) See Charles B. Schmitt, ‘William Harvey and Renaissance Aristotelianism. The Praefatio to De generatione animalium (1651)’, in Humanismus und Medizin, ed. by Gundolf Keil and Rudolf Schmitz (Weinheim: Acta humaniora, 1984), 117-138.
99. FN9898) William Harvey, Exercitationes de generatione animalium (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1651), 19.
100. FN9999) Ibid., 20.
101. FN100100) Ibid.
102. FN101101) Ibid., 21.
103. FN102102) Notably, the distinction between ideas and impressions occurs also in David Hume’s empiricism.
104. FN103103) Harvey refers directly to the fifty-eighth Epistle of Seneca. However, in his letter Seneca seeks to emphasize the ontological and epistemological primacy of the idea in relation to the impression, whereas Havery does the opposite.
105. FN104104) Harvey is implicitly referring to anatomical investigation.
106. FN105105) Ibid., 22.
107. FN106106) Ibid.
108. FN107107) Ibid., 22-23.
109. FN108108) Ibid., 25.
110. FN109109) Ibid., 27.
111. FN110110) Ibid.
112. FN111111) Ibid., 30.
113. FN112112) See Edwards, Paduan Aristotelianism and the Origins of Modern Theories of Methods, 205-220.
114. FN113113) Thomas Hobbes, Opera philosophica, ed. by William Molesworth (London: Bohn, 1739), 2.
115. FN114114) Ibid., 58-59.
116. FN115115) On some Aristotelian elements of Hobbes’ logic see Martine Pécherman, ‘La logique de Hobbes et la tradition aristotélienne,’ Hobbes Studies 8 (1995): 105-124; Marco Sgarbi, ‘La logica di Thomas Hobbes e la tradizione aristotelica,’ Lo Sguardo 5 (2011): 59-72.
117. FN116116) See Philippe Du Trieu, Manuductio ad Logicam (Oxford: Lichfield, 1678 2ed.). See Earline J. Ashworth, ‘Locke on Language’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984): 45-73; Hannah Dawson, Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14-30.
118. FN117117) There were two English editions of Du Trieu’s handbook (1662, 1678), which include an essay by Pierre Gassendi and Tully’s Logica apodictica. There are no clues in the text, nor in the preface and introduction, that this Logica apoditica was not written by Du Trieu, since it follows immediately after his work, though with a new pagination. Anthony à Wood, however, attributed the authorship of the treatise to Tully; see Worcester College MS 4.17 and Athenae Oxonienses an Exact History of all the Writers and Bishops who have had their Education in the University of Oxford, ed. by Anthony Wood (London: Rivington, 1817), 3, c. 1055-1059.
119. FN118118) Ibid. 5-6: ‘Q.7. Si praemissae sint causae conclusionis, quid tribuendum est sensibus externis, cum dicitur, Deficiente sensu deficit Scientia? R. Sensum esse omnis scientiae intellectivae januam verissimum est, Nihil enim est in intellectu, quod non prius fuit in sensu; vel scilicet directe, primario, et per se, ut Entia Materialia; vel indirecte et per aliud, ut Entia materiae expertia (puta Deus, Angeli, et Animae rationales). Hinc damus sensus esse causam Scientiae intellectivae sine qua non (utpote a quo originaliter dependet) non vero causam proprie dictam, ut sunt praemissae. Quod si quis sensum causam instrumentalem remotissimam esse contenderit, non altercabimur’.
120. FN119119) On the developments of the history of philosophy in Britain during this period see Jill Kraye, ‘British Philosophy Before Locke’, in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. by Steven Nadler (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 283-297. For the decline of the Aristotelian scientia see also Thomas Sorell, G. A. John Rogers, and Jill Kraye (eds), Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy: Seventeenth-Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge from Initial Principles (Dordrecht: Springer 2010), especially Rogers’ important paper on Locke’s rejection of Aristotle’s scientia based on principles. Locke’s refutation of Aristotelian demonstrative science needs to be placed within the context of British Aristotelianism, from which he seems to have derived his theory of the primacy of sensation.

Article metrics loading...


Affiliations: 1: Università di Verona


Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Subscribe to Citation alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    Vivarium — Recommend this title to your library

    Thank you

    Your recommendation has been sent to your librarian.

  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation