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Ockham and Buridan on Epistemic Sentences: Appellation of the Form and Appellation of Reason

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Abstract Buridan’s theory of sentences with epistemic verbs (‘to know’, ‘to believe’, etc.) has received much attention in recent scholarship. Its originality with respect to Ockham’s approach, however, has been importantly overestimated. The present paper argues that both doctrines share crucial features and basically belong to the same family. This is done by comparing Buridan’s notion of the ‘appellation of reason’ with Ockham’s application to epistemic sentences of the general principle that a predicate always ‘appellates its form’.

Affiliations: 1: University of Quebec at Montreal

10.1163/156853412X631906
/content/journals/10.1163/156853412x631906
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/content/journals/10.1163/156853412x631906
2012-01-01
2016-09-27

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