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International Institutions and Janus Faces: The Influence of International Institutions on Central Negotiators within Two-Level Games

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This study addresses two interrelated questions. First, how can we expand the utility of the two-level model by developing the international level of the game, and second, how can this new conceptualization of the two-level game improve our understanding of how chief negotiators create a negotiation strategy? To address these questions, it will be explained how a state formulates its international strategy by taking into account that states participate in international institutions and are bound by their own domestic politics. Specifically, the relationship between chief executive, that executive's perception of bargaining strength relative to the legislature and alliance membership will be framed in a two-level game. By utilizing a two-level model, it will be possible to construct a series of hypotheses that explain, which strategy the chief executive will use at the outset of a negotiation. The hypotheses will be tested by examining the strategies chosen by four heads of state (Francois Mitterrand, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl) towards the Iraqi government in the days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Overall, this study is meant to be a ``first-cut'' at explaining the choice of strategy during negotiations and addressing the deficiencies of the two-level model.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA


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