Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Diplomacy as Independent and Dependent Variable

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

A distinction between diplomacy as independent variable, impacting upon other developments, and diplomacy as dependent variable, adapting to other causes, is employed to underpin focused case analysis of negotiation between states. To dramatize diplomacy as dependent variable, it is hypothesized that allies with convergent interests would find negotiations between themselves more difficult when domestic constraints such as political ideology and pressure group activity intrude. To highlight diplomacy as independent variable, it is hypothesized that adversaries with divergent interests employ diplomatic statecraft to reduce the chances of war in periods of confrontation. Using a relatively small case sample, this study confirms these hypotheses, but reveals similarities as well as differences between the case categories. It is argued that the focused case approach is a fruitful way to yield much-needed generalizations about diplomatic statecraft.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Political Science, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840-4605, USA


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Negotiation — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation