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Negotiating with Villains Revisited: Research Note

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image of International Negotiation

An earlier article examined the conditions under which it is reasonable to negotiate with rogue states. This article extends the argument to non-state terrorist "villains". Despite the risks inherent in negotiating with terrorists, the risks of following a no-negotiation policy are likely to be more deadly. States need to assess terrorist interests and intentions to find if there are reasonable entry points for negotiation and take advantage of these to transform the conflict.

10.1163/1571806031310770
/content/journals/10.1163/1571806031310770
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/content/journals/10.1163/1571806031310770
2003-10-01
2016-12-11

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