Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Be Careful What You Compromise For: Postagreement Negotiations within the UN Desertification Convention

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

This article draws on principal-agent theories in the international organization literature and postagreement negotiation analysis in the negotiation literature to examine a case of international development negotiations among parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. The role of the “collective principal” ‐ the negotiating body of state actors that creates an international organization ‐ is described and the analysis examines subsequent negotiations when the parties, as principal, do not coalesce into a collective actor regarding the mandate for the organization ‐ or agent ‐ they created. The article suggests that postagreement negotiation analysis provides an understanding of the vehicle through which the “principal” provides “collective” oversight of the agent, and examines what we label the “regime interpretation” negotiations involved with this case.

Affiliations: 1: International Institute for Sustainable Development, Reporting Services 300 East 56th Street #11D, New York, NY 10022 USA, Email:


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Negotiation — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation