Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Domestic Unrest and the Initiation of Negotiations

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of International Negotiation

The main argument of this article is that we need to incorporate domestic-pressure arguments into conflict management studies and, at the same time, we need to include conflict-management opportunities in the study of domestic-international theory. This study looks at the impact of domestic incentives on a state’s decision to negotiate. The primary hypothesis is that domestic turmoil will increase the likelihood that rival states with a history of aggressive interaction shift their foreign policy to a more accommodative one. Testing my argument on strategic rivals between 1945 and 1995, I find that after controlling for the factors of history and level of hostility between the rivals, anti-government unrest actually increases the likelihood of negotiations taking place, while acts threatening the downfall of the regime tend to decrease the chance of witnessing negotiations.

Affiliations: 1: School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona 335 Social Sciences, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA, Email:


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Negotiation — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation