Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Differentiation, Leaders, and Fairness: Negotiating Climate Commitments in the European Community

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

Scholars contend that symmetrical environmental measures are widely used because they simplify negotiations, prevent countries from pursuing extreme bargaining positions, and reflect salient focal points. This article argues that it is possible to negotiate and reach asymmetrical environmental agreements that take into account significant national dissimilarities. It is demonstrated that analytical models and intuitively appealing model-based quantitative indicators of national circumstances can establish premises for negotiations leading to differentiated environmental agreements. While they do not take the place of political negotiation, they help identify a formula that defines the problem in a resolvable fashion and prevents the bargaining space from expanding uncontrollably. Moreover, in pre-Kyoto European Community climate policy, which this article empirically examines, high transaction costs and EC member states' ability to block costly agreements were not essential. The article concludes by suggesting four recommendations for reaching differentiated environmental agreements.

Affiliations: 1: Center for International Climate and Environmental Research-Oslo (CICERO), P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, N--0317 Oslo, Norway


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Negotiation — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation