Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Armed Attack against the Military Force of an International Organization and Use of Force in Self-Defence by a Troop-Contributing State: A Tentative Legal Assessment of an Unlikely Scenario

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

If the military force of an international organization is made the object of a military attack by a State, that international organization may be regarded as being entitled to use force in self-defence. However, since the forces of international organizations are generally composed of national contingents which States put at the disposal of the international organizations, the question may be raised as to whether, in case of an armed attack against such forces, the sending State would also be entitled to use force in self-defence to protect its national contingent. This question, which was addressed, albeit in a very cursory manner, in the 2009 Report of the EU Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, has to be answered taking into account the status of national contingents as organs of the sending States. By attaching relevance to the contingent's dual status and to the rationale underlying the rule on self-defence, this study argues that whenever the national contingent is made the object of an armed attack the possibility for the sending State to invoke self-defence cannot be excluded. In particular, the invocability of self-defence by the sending State should be admitted in those cases in which the armed attack is clearly aimed at targeting that State.

Affiliations: 1: Associate Professor of International Law, University of Macerata, Italy;, Email:


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Organizations Law Review — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation