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Reply to Silcox on Moral Luck

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In earlier work, I argued that examples supposed to substantiate consequential moral luck can lose their anomalous appearance if due account is taken of the moral obligation to discharge epistemic responsibilities, and of the different scope and focus of this obligation for the agent as contrasted with the observer. In his recent JMP article, Mark Silcox argues that my explanatory strategy is dependent on an unacceptable commitment to an 'ineliminable epistemic gulf ' between first-person and third-person perspectives. Here I attempt a defence against Silcox's criticism, and tentatively suggest some wider implications of the debate.


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