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In his paper 'Moral Responsibility and Moral Luck,' Brian Rosebury argues that believers in moral luck ignore the fact that an agent's moral responsibilities often encompass certain epistemic obligations not usually recognized by commonsense morality. I have suggested in my article 'Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck' that the plausibility of Rosebury's position depends upon a philosophically dubious account of the relation between first- and third-person perspectives on ethically significant events. Rosebury has defended himself against this charge in the present issue of this Journal; here, I develop my criticism at greater length.

10.1163/174552409X402377
/content/journals/10.1163/174552409x402377
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/content/journals/10.1163/174552409x402377
2009-03-01
2016-09-28

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