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The Personal and the Fitting

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This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). In this book, Rønnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value—an instance of the notion of good for a person—in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: (i) Rønnow-Rasmussen’s discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; (ii) his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of ‘for someone’s sake (fss) attitudes’; and (iii) his critique of the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, jonas.olson@philosophy.su.se

10.1163/17455243-01103001
/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01103001
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1. Brentano F. 1969. On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. German original published in1889.
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7. Parfit D. 2011. On What Matters vol. Vol 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Rabinowicz W. ,and Rønnow-Rasmussen T. 2004. ‘ "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value"’, Ethics Vol 114: 391423. [Crossref]
9. Schroeder M. 2010. ‘ "Buck-Passers’ Negative Thesis"’, Philosophical Explorations Vol 12: 34147.
10. Skorupski J. 2010. The Domain of Reasons . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01103001
2014-05-02
2017-11-23

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