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Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

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Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

Affiliations: 1: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, h.w.a.evers@rug.nl

10.1163/17455243-01304002
/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01304002
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1. Evers D. 2014. “"Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality",” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol 17:2.
2. Finlay S. 2008. “"The Error in the Error Theory",” Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol 86:3.
3. Finlay S. 2009. “"Oughts and Ends",” Philosophical Studies Vol 143:3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9318-x
4. Finlay S . 2014. " Confusion of Tongues ". A Theory of Normativity , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Joyce R. 2001. The Myth of Morality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Joyce R. 2011. “"The Error in ‘The Error in the Error Theory’",” Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol 89:3.
7. Olson J. , 2010. “"In Defense of Moral Error Theory".” In: Brady M (ed), New Waves in Metaethics , London: Palgrave Macmillan.
8. Olson J. 2014. Moral Error TheoryHistory, Critique, Defence , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Von Fintel K. , & Iatridou S. , 2008. “"How to Say Ought in Foreign: The Composition of Weak Necessity Modals",” in Guéron J. , & Lecarme J. , eds., Time and Modality , Dordrecht: Springer.
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/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01304002
2016-06-11
2017-06-29

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