Cookies Policy
X

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen

image of Journal of Moral Philosophy

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

Affiliations: 1: Stockholm University, jonas.olson@philosophy.su.se

10.1163/17455243-01304005
/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01304005
dcterms_title,pub_keyword,dcterms_description,pub_author
10
5
Loading
Loading

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01304005
Loading

Data & Media loading...

1. Boghossian P. , 2006. “"What is Relativism?”" In Truth and Realism , edited by P. Greenough , and M. Lynch . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Bykvist K. , and J. Olson 2009. “"Expressivism and Moral Certitude",” Philosophical Quarterly Vol 59: 20215. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.580.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.580.x
3. Bykvist K. and J. Olson 2012. “Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, , vol. 6, no. 2.
4. Evers D. 2014. “"Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality",” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol 17: 28597. doi: 10.1007/s10677-013-9437-0. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9437-0
5. Evers D. 2016. “"Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory",” Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 13: 30520. doi 10.1163/17455243-01304002.
6. Finlay S. 2009. “"Oughts and Ends",” Philosophical Studies Vol 143: 31540. doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9202-8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9202-8
7. Finlay S. 2014. Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Joyce R. 2001. The Myth of Morality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Lewis D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds . Oxford: Blackwell.
10. Olson J. 2010. “"The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It",” Ratio Vol 23: 87101. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00452.x. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00452.x
11. Olson J. 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Price R. , 1948. A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals , edited by D. D. Raphael . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
13. Streumer B. 2013. “"Can We Believe the Error Theory?”" Journal of Philosophy Vol 110: 194212. doi: 10.5840/jphil2013110431. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2013110431
14. Streumer B. 2016. “"Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either",” Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 13: 32138. doi 10.1163/17455243-01304003.
15. Streumer B. forthcoming. Unbelievable Errors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Toppinen T. 2016. “"Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?”" Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol 13: 33962. doi 10.1163/17455243-01304004.
http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01304005
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01304005
2016-06-11
2018-10-16

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
     
    Journal of Moral Philosophy — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation