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Thickness and Evaluation

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This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Rude, the Lewd and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Väyrynen’s arguments generalize to thin evaluative concepts.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, matti.eklund@filosofi.uu.se

10.1163/17455243-01401001
/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01401001
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/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-01401001
2017-12-28
2017-08-17

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