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Expressivism and Mind-Dependence

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Distinct Existences

image of Journal of Moral Philosophy

Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in some objectionable way. This paper develops an argument which not only shows that this is and cannot be the case, but also – and perhaps more importantly – offers a diagnosis why philosophers are nevertheless so often led to think otherwise.

Affiliations: 1: School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Science, University of Edinburgh,


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