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Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience

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I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a contrast argument, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals (EEDIs) to establish a phenomenal contrast between EEDIs and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming non-skeptical moral realism, is that badness is represented in the normal individual’s experience but not in the EEDI’s experience. I consider and reject four alternative explanations of the contrast.

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