Cookies Policy
X

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Open Access Re-enter the United Nations: A role for the Peacebuilding Commission in East Timor? Le retour des Nations unies : Un rôle pour la Commission de consolidation de la paix au Timor oriental ? O regresso das Nações Unidas : Um Papel para a Comissão de Manutenção da Paz em Timor-Leste ?

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Re-enter the United Nations: A role for the Peacebuilding Commission in East Timor? Le retour des Nations unies : Un rôle pour la Commission de consolidation de la paix au Timor oriental ? O regresso das Nações Unidas : Um Papel para a Comissão de Manutenção da Paz em Timor-Leste ?

  • PDF
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of Lusotopie

On 23 June 2006 the UN proudly launched its Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) seeking to reverse a situation where international efforts to rebuild war-torn societies had, more often than not, failed. Mindful of such cases as Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, and Liberia, where security deteriorated once international support was withdrawn, obviously the drafters of the PBC had much to learn from the East Timor (Timor-Leste) example. This was highlighted by the massive civil unrest sparked off in East Timor in early 2006, returning to world attention in February 2008 with the near assassination of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) president and the continuing humanitarian crisis.

Initially, only Burundi and Sierra Leone came under the purview of the PCB, although emergency funding had also been advanced to Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic. In December 2007, Guinea-Bissau, became the third country to win PBC support as a state in danger of backsliding into violence. Given the ad hoc nature of past UN missions in East Timor/Timor-Leste, the hybrid character of security operations conducted independent of the UN flag, and the general lack of governance capacity inside the new nation, this article explicitly argues in favor of extending PBC commitment to Timor-Leste. Le 23 juin 2006, l'Onu a fièrement lancé sa Commission de consolidation de la paix (CCP), cherchant à inverser une situation dans laquelle les efforts internationaux visant à reconstruire les sociétés qui étaient dévastées par la guerre avaient, le plus souvent, échoué. Gardant à l'esprit des cas tels que celui d'Haïti, du Cambodge, de la Somalie et du Liberia, où la sécurité s'était détériorée dès le retrait de l'aide internationale, il est évident que les rédacteurs de la CCP avaient beaucoup à apprendre de l'exemple de Timor oriental (Timor-Leste). Ceci a été souligné par les troubles civils importants qui se sont déclenchés, au début de l'année 2006, à Timor oriental, lesquels ont attiré à nouveau l'attention du monde entier en février 2008, avec la tentative d'assassinat du président de la République démocratique du Timor-Leste (RDTL) et la crise humanitaire qui se poursuit.

À l'origine, seuls le Burundi et la Sierra Leone bénéficiaient du dispositif de la CCP, bien que des financements d'urgence aient également été avancés pour la Côte d'Ivoire et la République centrafricaine. En décembre 2007, la GuinéeBissau, est devenue le troisième pays ayant obtenu le soutien de la CCP, en raison du danger, pour cet État, de retomber dans la violence. Étant donné la nature ad hoc des précédentes missions de l'Onu à Timor oriental/Timor-Leste, le caractère hybride des opérations de sécurité menées indépendamment du drapeau de l'Onu et le manque général d'une capacité de gouvernance au sein de la nouvelle nation, cet article argumente explicitement en faveur de l'extension de l'engagement de la CCP à Timor-Leste.
No dia 23 de Junho de 2006, as Nações Unidas criaram orgulhosamente a sua Comissão de Manutenção da Paz (CMP), com o objectivo de inverter a situação onde os esforços internacionais para reconstruir as sociedades devastadas pela guerra têm muitas vezes falhado. Sem esquecer casos como os do Haiti, do Cambodja, da Somália e da Libéria, onde a segurança se deteriorou quando a ajuda internacional se retirou, obviamente os criadores da CMP tiveram de aprender muito com o exemplo de Timor-Leste. Isto foi realçado pela agitação civil em grande escala desencadeada no início de 2006, atraindo de novo as atenções mundiais em Fevereiro de 2008 com a tentativa de assassinato do presidente da República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) e a continuação da crise humanitária.

No início, apenas o Burundi e a Serra Leoa estiveram sob a alçada da CMP, apesar do fundo de emergência também ter sido atribuído à Costa do Marfim e à República Centro-Africana. Em Dezembro de 2007, a Guiné-Bissau tornouse no terceiro país a obter o apoio da CMP como um estado em perigo de voltar a enfrentar a violência. Tendo em conta a natureza ad hoc das missões anteriores das Nações Unidas em Timor-Leste, o carácter híbrido das operações de segurança dirigidas de maneira independente em relação à bandeira das Nações Unidas e a falta geral de capacidade de governação da nova nação, este artigo defende o alargamento do compromisso da CMP em Timor-Leste.

Affiliations: 1: Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University (Japan)

Loading

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/176830808786933355
Loading

Data & Media loading...

http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/176830808786933355
Loading
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/176830808786933355
2008-11-01
2016-12-04

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation