Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Phenomenological Time, Historical Time, and The Writing of History

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of Journal of the Philosophy of History

AbstractContrary to Paul Ricoeur’s claim that there is an unbridgeable chasm between phenomenological time and historical time, my studies have shown me that the former is the cognitive foundation for the latter. The temporality formed in each sentential judgment can be discerned through a stylistic analysis of its grammar. This grammatical foundation which is established at the pre-reflective level of sentence formation becomes a basis in the maturing individual for conceptual preferences. How experience is organized informally and consequently reflected upon in the everyday judgment, or more formally in the writing of history, are outcomes of this grammatical logic. What I term one’s ‘historical logic’ differs in categorically interesting ways in each person; for each person it is an invariant grammatical organization that guides attended experience informing a person’s sense of ‘history’ and its meaning over a career of thought. The grammatical organization itself stems from varying part-whole organizations that perceptually provide the form grammar then instantiates. The epistemological basis of my approach is developed from Kant and Edmund Husserl insofar as their conceptions of temporal generation in judgment. My grammatical analyses rely upon the transformational grammar of Noam Chomsky.In this essay, I show the invariant character of two distinct historical logics through the careers of thought of two Tudor-Stuart historians, G.R. Elton and his student Arthur Joseph Slavin, and two Tudor-Stuart personalities, Edward Coke and Francis Bacon. I have found historical logics to be intergenerational. Forms of historical logic are more than likely psycho-genetic, recurring in every generation. I have provided evidence for this claim in studies I have made of adolescents who have first come to master the well-formed sentence in personal expression.Among the implications of the findings here are that ‘objectivity’ as well as ‘historical objectivity’ are better understood as ‘multiply valid’ among the judgments of equally informed and keen observers and interpreters. There is an unbridgeable foundation that differentiates one person’s conception of temporal organization from another. Synthetically, we are separated in our judgments, even when we can arrive at analytical understandings of these differences.

Affiliations: 1: University of


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    Journal of the Philosophy of History — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation