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A Contested Consensus Rule

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How to Make the osce More Effective

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The article tests the wisdom of amending the osce rule of consensus against past experiences of introducing a “consensus minus one” procedure, establishing mandatory cooperative “mechanisms” which can be triggered by a qualified minority of states, or introducing autonomously operating institutions. It argues that amending the consensus rule does not per se lead to a stronger Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. While the participating states could benefit from more independent osce institutions, decisions leading in that direction would need time to mature, particularly in the current political environment marked by the very low level of mutual trust within the osce.

Affiliations: 1: Head of Disarmament of Arms Control and Conflict Resolution at the Institute of Word Economy and International Relations (imemo) of the Russian Academy of Sciences Professor of International Relations at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University)


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