Cookies Policy
X

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Hobbes’s De Corpore on Modalities and Its Contemporary Critiques

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of Hobbes Studies

Hobbes considered as unambiguous and unproblematic his demonstration in De Corpore that every effect past, present or future is necessary, since it always requires a sufficient cause that cannot be sufficient without being necessary, so that nothing is possible which will not be actual at some time. Now, this approach to necessity and possibility was received by his contemporary readers as missing its aim. Two immediate criticisms of De Corpore by Moranus and Ward exhibit from this viewpoint an interesting difference as to their common argument that only hypothetical necessity can result from Hobbes’s premises. My essay relates this argumentative difference to the absence (Moranus) or presence (Ward) in the background of the free-will dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall. From there, I examine also different interpretations of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ in the indirect critical reception of De Corpore, when the target is Hobbes’s necessitarianism in the controversy with Bramhall, based on significant material from his De Corpore project. Remarkably, although Leibniz agrees with Bramhall that Hobbes only proves a hypothetical necessity, Leibniz’s understanding of hypothetical necessity is not that of Bramhall. Another striking difference is displayed in the use of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ by More, which as it were blurs the connection of the free-will issue with Hobbes’s general doctrine of causality.

Affiliations: 1: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CRAL, CNRS-EHESS) martinepecharman@googlemail.com

10.1163/18750257-03001003
/content/journals/10.1163/18750257-03001003
dcterms_title,pub_keyword,dcterms_description,pub_author
10
5
Loading
Loading

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/18750257-03001003
Loading

Data & Media loading...

http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/18750257-03001003
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/18750257-03001003
2017-03-13
2017-11-22

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
     
    Hobbes Studies — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation