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What Motivates Fregean Anti-Individualism?

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In Anti-Individualism and Knowledge Jessica Brown criticises views of content that combine Fregean Sense and anti-individualism. Brown assumes that all Fregean theories are motivated by a picture of the rational thinker as someone who will always have transparent access to the simple inferential consequences of his thoughts. This picture, Brown argues, is incompatible with anti-individualism about content. While traditional Fregean theories have indeed had such motivation, Brown’s mistake is in attributing this motivation to the modern Fregean anti-individualist. My goal in this paper is to bring to light a different, and seldom discussed, motivation for Fregean views of content which is immune to Browns objections.

Affiliations: 1: Independent researcher, University of Copenhagen, jgersel@gmail.com

10.1163/18756735-000009
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/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-000009
2017-06-14
2018-09-25

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