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Counting Again

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The authors consider a recurring objection to fictional realism, the view that (broadly speaking) fictional characters are objects. The authors call this the counting objection. Russell presses a version of the objection against Meinong’s view. Everett presses a version of the objection against contemporary fictional realist views, as (in effect) do Nolan and Sandgren. As the authors see it, the objection assumes that the fictional realist must provide criteria of identity for fictional characters, so its force depends on the plausibility of that assumption. Rather than coming up with such criteria, a fictional realist might argue that the demand is misplaced.

Affiliations: 1: Illinois State University dsanson@gmail.com ; 2: University of Kansas caplan.16@gmail.com ; 3: Marist College cathleen.muller@marist.edu

10.1163/18756735-000017
/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-000017
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1. Caplan Ben, and Muller Cathleen, 2015: “"Brutal Identity"”. In: Brock Stuart, and Everett Anthony (eds.), Fictional Objects . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 174207. [Crossref]
2. Everett Anthony 2005: “"Against Fictional Realism"”. Journal of Philosophy Vol 102, 624649. [Crossref]
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4. Fine Kit 1982: “"The Problem of Non-Existents: i. Internalism"”. Topoi Vol 1, 97140. [Crossref]
5. Griffin Nicholas 1985–1986: “"Russell’s Critique of Meinong’s Theory of Objects"”. Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol 25–26, 375401.
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7. Kripke Saul A. 2013: Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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9. Milne Daniel Alexander 2013: “"Everett’s Dilemma: How Fictional Realists Can Cope with Ontic Vagueness"”. Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol 88, 3354.
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12. Parsons Terence 2000: Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Parsons Terence, 2011: “"Fictional Characters and Indeterminate Identity"”. In: Lihoreau Franck (ed.), Truth in Fiction . Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2742.
14. Priest Graham 2002: Beyond the Limits of Thought . 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
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16. Quine Willard Van Orman 1948: “"On What There Is"”. Review of Metaphysics Vol 2, 2138. Reprinted in: Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1953, 1–19.
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/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-000017
2017-06-14
2017-11-24

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