Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

On Virtue, Credit and Safety

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of Grazer Philosophische Studien

According to robust virtue epistemology, the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that in cases of knowledge, the subject’s cognitive success is attributable to her cognitive agency. But what does it take for a subject’s cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency? A promising answer is that the subject’s cognitive abilities have to contribute to the safety of her epistemic standing with respect to her inquiry, in order for her cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency. Call this idea the contribution thesis. The author will argue that the contribution thesis follows naturally from virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge, and that it is precisely the contribution thesis that allows the virtue epistemologist to deal with a wide variety of objections. Nevertheless, the principal aim of this paper is to argue that virtue epistemological theories of knowledge that are committed to the contribution thesis are ultimately untenable. There are cases of knowledge where the subject’s cognitive abilities do not improve the safety of the subject’s belief.

Affiliations: 1: University of Helsinki,


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

1. Bogardus Tomas 2014. “"Knowledge Under Threat".” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol 88, 289313.
2. Carter Adam 2016. “"Robust Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology: A New Solution".” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol 97, 140155.
3. Gaultier Benoit 2014. “"Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck".” Dialectica Vol 68, 477497.
4. Goldman Alvin 1976. “"Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge".” Journal of Philosophy Vol 73, 771791.
5. Greco John 2007. “"Worries about Pritchard’s Safety".” Synthese Vol 158, 299302.
6. Greco John 2010. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Greco John, 2012. "“Better Safe than Sensitive.”" In: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology . Edited by Becker Kelly, and Black Tim, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193206.
8. Greco John, 2016. “"Knowledge, Virtue, and Safety".” In: Performance Epistemology – Foundations and Applications . Edited by Fernández Vargas Miguel Angel, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5161.
9. Hawthorne John,, and Lasonen-Aarnio Maria, 2009. “"Knowledge and Objective Chance".” In: Williamson on Knowledge . Edited by Greenough Patrick, and Pritchard Duncan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 92108.
10. Hirvelä Jaakko 2017a. “"Is it Safe to Disagree?”" Ratio Vol 30, 305321.
11. Hirvelä Jaakko 2017b. “"Global Safety: How to Deal with Necessary Truths".” Synthese (online first)
12. Kallestrup Jesper,, and Pritchard Duncan, 2013. “"Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence".” In: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work . Edited by Henning Tim, and Schweikard David, New York: Routledge, 209227.
13. Kelp Christoph 2016a. “"Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited".” American Philosophical Quarterly Vol 53, 2737.
14. Kelp Christoph 2016b. “"Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style".” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol 93, 79100.
15. Kelp Christoph 2017. “"Lotteries and Justification".” Synthese Vol 194, 12331244.
16. Kelp Christoph, forthcoming. “"Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology".” In: Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind . Edited by Carter Adam,, Gordon Emma, and Jarvis Benjamin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Lackey Jennifer 2007. “"Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know".” Synthese Vol 158, 345361.
18. Lackey Jennifer 2009. “"Knowledge and Credit".” Philosophical Studies Vol 142, 2742.
19. Littlejohn Clayton 2014. “"Fake Barns and False Dilemmas".” Episteme Vol 11, 369389.
20. Luper Steven, 2003. "“Indiscernability Skepiticism.”" In: The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays . Edited by Luper Steven, Aldershot: Ashgate, 183202.
21. Luper Steven 2006. “"Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account".” Synthese Vol 153, 161170.
22. Millar Allan, 2010. "“Knowledge and Recognition.”" In: The Nature and Value of Knowledge . Edited by Pritchard Duncan,, Millar Allan, and Haddock Adrian. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89188.
23. Miracchi Lisa 2015. “"Competence to Know".” Philosophical Studies Vol 172, 2956.
24. Neta Ram,, and Rohrbaugh Guy 2004. “"Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge".” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol 85, 396406.
25. Pritchard Duncan 2005. Epistemic Luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Pritchard Duncan 2007. “"Anti-luck Epistemology".” Synthese Vol 158, 277297.
27. Pritchard Duncan, 2010. "“Knowledge and Understanding.”" In: The Nature and Value of Knowledge . Edited by Pritchard Duncan,, Millar Allan, and Haddock Adrian, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 588.
28. Pritchard Duncan 2012. “"Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology".” Journal of Philosophy Vol 109, 247279.
29. Pritchard Duncan 2015. “"Anti-luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem".” Philosophical Studies Vol 172, 93111.
30. Reed Baron 2009. “"A New Argument for Skepticism".” Philosophical Studies Vol 142, 91104.
31. Sainsbury Richard 1997. “"Easy Possibilities".” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol 57, 907919.
32. Silva Paul forthcoming. “"Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification".” Episteme .
33. Sosa Ernest 1999. “"How to Defeat Opposition to Moore".” Philosophical Perspectives Vol 13, 141154.
34. Sosa Ernest 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: Volume i . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35. Sosa Ernest 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge , Volume ii . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
36. Sosa Ernest 2011. Knowing Full Well . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
37. Sosa Ernest 2015. Judgment and Agency . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
38. Turri John,. 2016 “"Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less".” In: Performance Epistemology – Foundations and Applications . Edited by Fernández Vargas Miguel Angel, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 124134.
39. Williamson Timothy 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    Grazer Philosophische Studien — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation