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Is It Always Good to Be Reasonable? (Ist es immer gut, vernünftig zu sein?)

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The claim that it is always good to be reasonable can be understood to mean either that being reasonable is always better than being unreasonable all things considered or that being reasonable is better than being unreasonable in at least one respect. This paper tries to evaluate both claims and argues for the second, weaker thesis while dismissing the first. To do this, two distinct ideas contained in our every-day understanding of reasonability are distinguished and formulated more precisely. It is then argued that, regardless of which idea we take to be fundamental, being reasonable is always good in at least one respect, though not always good all things considered.

Affiliations: 1: Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg konstantin.weber@gmx.de

10.1163/18756735-09404002
/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-09404002
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1. Broome John 2013: Rationality through Reasoning . Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.
2. Davidson Donald 1985: „"Incoherence and Irrationality".“ Dialectica Vol 39 (4), 345354.
3. Korsgaard Christine M. 2009: Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Parfit Derek 2011: On What Matters. Volume One . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-09404002
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/content/journals/10.1163/18756735-09404002
2017-10-24
2018-10-15

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