Cookies Policy
X

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of Contemporary Pragmatism

Even though pragmatic theories of truth are not widely held, they have advantages not found elsewhere. Here I focus on one such advantage: that a pragmatic theory of truth does not limit the range of truth-apt beliefs and thereby “block the way of inquiry.” Furthermore, I argue that this speaks for a particular formulation of the pragmatic theory of truth, one that shifts away from Peircean approaches and their emphasis on temporal independence, and toward a theory that instead emphasizes truth’s subject independence.

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY USA 14623 jmcgsh@rit.edu

10.1163/18758185-01402001
/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-01402001
dcterms_title,pub_keyword,dcterms_description,pub_author
10
5
Loading
Loading

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-01402001
Loading

Data & Media loading...

1. Ayer A.J. 1952. Language, Truth and Logic . New York: Dover.
2. Bacon Michael. 2014. “"On Cheryl Misak’s Modest Pragmatism",” Contemporary Pragmatism Vol 11: 95105.
3. Bennett Jonathan. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals . New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Bourget David,, and Chalmers David. 2014. “"What Do Philosophers Believe?"” Philosophical Studies Vol 170: 465500.
5. Brown Matthew. 2012. “"John Dewey’s Logic of Science",” hopos Vol 2: 258306.
6. Burke Tom. 1994. Dewey’s New Logic . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7. Capps John. 2014. “"Radical Pragmatism: An Operator’s Guide",” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Vol 6: 125144.
8. da Costa Newton, and French Steven. 2003. Science and Partial Truth . New York: Oxford University Press.
9. de Waal Cornelis. 1999. “"Eleven Challenges to the Pragmatic Theory of Truth",” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol 35: 748766.
10. Dewey John. 1941. “"Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 38: 169186.
11. Dewey John. 1988. The Quest for Certainty . Carbondale, il: Southern Illinois University Press.
12. Dewey John. 1988a. Reconstruction in Philosophy . Carbondale, il: Southern Illinois University Press.
13. Dewey John. 1991. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry . Carbondale, il: Southern Illinois University Press.
14. Dewey John,, 1991a. “"Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder",” in: Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) The Later Works of John Dewey , vol. Vol 14, Carbondale, il: Southern Illinois University Press), pp. 390.
15. Engel Pascal. 2002. Truth . Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
16. Hawthorne John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries . New York: Oxford University Press.
17. Hintikka Jaako. 1970. “"‘Knowing That One Knows’ Reviewed",” Synthese Vol 21: 141162.
18. Horwich Paul. 2010. Truth-Meaning-Reality . New York: Oxford University Press.
19. Misak Cheryl. 2000. Truth, Politics, Morality . London: Routledge.
20. Misak Cheryl. 2004. Truth and the End of Inquiry . New York: Oxford University Press.
21. Misak Cheryl,. 2007. “"Pragmatism and Deflationism",” in New Pragmatists , ed. Misak Cheryl. (New York: Oxford University Press) pp. 6890.
22. Peirce C.S. 1992. Reasoning and the Logic of Things . Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press.
23. Price Huw. 2003. “"Truth as Convenient Friction",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 100: 167190.
24. Price Huw. 2013. Expressivisim, Pragmatism and Representationalism . Cambridge uk: Cambridge University Press.
25. Putnam Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth and History . Cambridge uk: Cambridge University Press.
26. Rorty Richard,. 1991. “"Solidarity or Objectivity?"” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Philosophical Papers Volume 1 by Rorty Richard (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press) pp. 2134.
27. Russell Bertrand. 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth . London: Allen and Unwin.
28. Schmitt Frederick. 1995. Truth: A Primer . Boulder, co: Westview Press.
29. Shafer-Landau Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defense . New York: Oxford University Press.
30. Stanley Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests . New York: Oxford University Press.
31. Tarski Alfred. 1944. “"The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics",” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Vol 4: 341376.
32. Thayer H.S. 1947. “"Two Theories of Truth: The Relation between the Theories of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 44: 516527.
33. Williams Bernard,. 1973. “"Deciding to Believe",” in Problems of the Self by Williams Bernard (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press) pp. 136151.
34. Wright Crispin. 1992. Truth and Objectivity . Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press.
http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-01402001
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-01402001
2017-06-11
2018-06-22

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
     
    Contemporary Pragmatism — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation