Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Full Access The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’s Defense Policy, 1969-1971

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Unsuccessful Challenge to Japan’s Defense Policy, 1969-1971

  • PDF
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of Journal of American-East Asian Relations

The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 heralded a new approach wherein the United States sought to limit military commitments, particularly of ground forces, in Asia. This departure was seized on by Nakasone Yasuhiro as an opportunity to push for “autonomous defense” at the risk of undermining the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. For Premier Satō, however, the treaty was the cornerstone of Japan’s relationship with the United States and vital to the security of Japan and Northeast Asia. Such a divergence of views went to the heart of Japan’s security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, America would cajole and pressure Japan to assume more of the regional defense burden, while on the other, Japanese elites resisted such pressure due to fears of alienating and alarming both Japan’s neighbors and the Japanese public. The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone’s ideas on “autonomous defense” posed a major challenge to the postwar consensus on defense and Japan’s security ties to the United States. Ultimately, however, they were not able to undermine this consensus which lasted long after the end of the Cold War.

Affiliations: 1: University College Dublin, Email:, URL:


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation