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The Russian Empire at War

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Lieven's book is the first scholarly work to provide thorough analysis of the European stage of Russia's campaign against Napoleon in 1813 – 1814. e review essay discusses how Lieven's book departs from conventional Russian historiography on the Napoleonic era by emphasizing the logistical and strategic contributions of Russian cavalry and by illustrating the advantages of the "long-war" plan adopted by Alexander I and Barclay de Tolly. e review endorses Lieven's conclusion that a key reason for the Russian victory in 1814 was that Russian leadership "outthought" Napoleon.


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