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Reflective Knowledge and Intellectual Assurance

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image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

In this discussion of Sosa's second volume on reflective knowledge, I focus on the question of whether Sosa's account of knowledge is flawed for failing to capture a connection between possessing knowledge and gaining assurance of truth. In particular, I worry that if there is no more to reflective knowledge than apt belief about apt belief, where the understanding of aptness is the same at both the first and the second level, Sosa hasn't given us a way of gaining philosophically satisfying knowledge.

10.1163/221027011X565339
/content/journals/10.1163/221027011x565339
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/content/journals/10.1163/221027011x565339
2011-01-01
2016-09-29

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