Cookies Policy
X

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ED—which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through.

Affiliations: 1: University of Pavia, Italy, tommaso.piazza@unipv.it

10.1163/22105700-00001246
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00001246
dcterms_title,pub_keyword,dcterms_description,pub_author
10
5
Loading
Loading

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00001246
Loading

Data & Media loading...

1. Nozick R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.
2. Pritchard D. (2007). “"Anti-Luck Epistemology",” Synthese Vol 158: 277298.
3. Pritchard D. (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Pritchard D. (2015). “"Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to My Critics",” Analysis Vol 75: 627637.
5. Zalabardo J. (2015). “"Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem",” Analysis Vol 75: 615627.
http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00001246
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00001246
2017-08-19
2018-09-22

Sign-in

Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
     
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation