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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis

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Affiliations: 1: Auburn University, United States, lockhartt@auburn.edu

10.1163/22105700-00001247
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00001247
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/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00001247
2016-12-26
2017-11-25
1. Conant J., (2012). “"Two Varieties of Skepticism".” In Abel G., and Conant J. (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology, Volume 2 , 173. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. [Crossref]
2. Johnston M. (2004). “"That Obscure Object of Hallucination",” Philosophical Studies Vol 120: 113183. [Crossref]
3. McDowell J. (2009). “"The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument".” In his The Engaged Intellect . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
4. McDowell J. (2010). “"Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism",” Philosophical Explorations Vol 13: 243255. [Crossref]
5. McDowell J. (2011). Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge . Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
6. Neta R., (2008). “"In Defence of Disjunctivism".” In Haddock A., and Macpherson F. (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge , 311329. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press. [Crossref]
7. Pritchard D. (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Pritchard D. (2015). Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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