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An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction

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In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure.

Affiliations: 1: St. John’s University, motimizra@gmail.com

10.1163/22105700-00503001
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00503001
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2016-12-20
2017-11-20

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