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Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism

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This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s Extended Rationality is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.

Affiliations: 1: University of Bologna, giorgio.volpe@unibo.it

10.1163/22105700-00704004
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00704004
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1. Coliva A. (2012). “"Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What else?!)",” Synthese Vol 189: 235254.
2. Coliva A. (2015). Extended Rationality . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
3. Davies M., (2009). “"Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects".” In Ravenscroft I. (ed.), Mind, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson , 337383. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Künne W. (2003). Conceptions of Truth . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Lynch M.P. (2009). Truth as One and Many . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6. Wright C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity . Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press.
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/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-00704004
2017-11-23
2018-05-27

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