Cookies Policy

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

I accept this policy

Find out more here

Comments on Annalisa Coliva, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology

No metrics data to plot.
The attempt to load metrics for this article has failed.
The attempt to plot a graph for these metrics has failed.
The full text of this article is not currently available.

Brill’s MyBook program is exclusively available on BrillOnline Books and Journals. Students and scholars affiliated with an institution that has purchased a Brill E-Book on the BrillOnline platform automatically have access to the MyBook option for the title(s) acquired by the Library. Brill MyBook is a print-on-demand paperback copy which is sold at a favorably uniform low price.

Access this article

+ Tax (if applicable)
Add to Favorites
You must be logged in to use this functionality

image of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

In Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, Annalisa Coliva aims to by-pass traditional sceptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge by arguing that all thinking and knowing ultimately rely on hinge assumptions which are immune from doubt because of their foundational role in the very framework that makes knowledge and rational thought possible. In defending her position Coliva also rejects the relativist challenge that there could be incompatible but equally plausible systems of justification relying on alternative hinges or assumptions. In this response to Coliva, I argue that even if we accept that we need to rely on some core assumptions in order to get the process of rational thought going, the question of the uniqueness of these assumptions remains open. I maintain that Coliva’s two argumentative strategies against the possibility of relativism, one based on empirical considerations and a second relying on considerations from logic do not guarantee the uniqueness of hinge assumptions and the possibility of at least a moderate form of relativism looms large.

Affiliations: 1: University College Dublin, Ireland,


Full text loading...


Data & Media loading...

1. Boghossian P. (2006). Fear of Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Burge T. (2010). Origins of Objectivity . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Coliva A. (2010). “"Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?"” Philosophical Investigations Vol 33: 123.
4. Jenkin Z., & Siegel S. (2015). “"Cognitive Penetrability, Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics",” Review of Philosophy and Psychology Vol 6: 531545.
5. Putnam H. (1994). “"Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 91: 445517.
6. Stokes D. (2013). “"Cognitive Penetrability of Perception",” Philosophy Compass Vol 8: 646663.
7. Wittgenstein L., (1969). On Certainty , edited by Anscombe G.E.M., and von Wright G.H.. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Article metrics loading...



Can't access your account?
  • Tools

  • Add to Favorites
  • Printable version
  • Email this page
  • Subscribe to ToC alert
  • Get permissions
  • Recommend to your library

    You must fill out fields marked with: *

    Librarian details
    Your details
    Why are you recommending this title?
    Select reason:
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism — Recommend this title to your library
  • Export citations
  • Key

  • Full access
  • Open Access
  • Partial/No accessInformation