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Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism

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In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel’s article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel’s, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I discuss the question whether Barel’s “Rationalistic” anti-skeptical argument is successful.

Affiliations: 1: University of California, Santa Barbara,


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1. Barel F. ( 2012). “ "Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism",” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Vol 2: 2143.
2. Brueckner A. ( 1986). “ "Brains in a Vat",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 83: 14867. (Reprinted in Brueckner 2010.)
3. ––––. ( 1999). “ "Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism",” 22950in Stern R. (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects . (Reprinted in Brueckner 2010.)
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5. ––––. ( 2010). Essays on Skepticism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Burge T. ,( 1986). “ "Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception",” 11736in McDowell J. ,and Pettit P. (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. ––––. ( 1988). “ "Individualism and Self-Knowledge",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 85: 64963.
8. ––––. ( 2003a). “ "Perceptual Entitlement",” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol 67: 50348.
9. ––––. ( 2003b). “ "Some Reflections on Scepticism: Reply to Stroud",” 33546in Hahn M. ,and Ramberg B. (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Stroud B. ( 1968). “ "Transcendental Arguments",” Journal of Philosophy Vol 65: 24156.

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