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Underdetermination Skepticism and Skeptical Dogmatism

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The Mundane World Hypothesis ( mwh) says that we have material bodies, we have brains located inside our bodies, we have sense organs which process visual information, the direct cause of our perceptual judgments is typically macroscopic material objects, and we live in a material world. Skeptics using underdetermination arguments argue mwhhas no more epistemic merit than some skeptical competitor, e.g., that we are in the Matrix. Since such competitor hypotheses are equipollent, we are not justified in believing mwh. This paper takes the underdetermination skeptic’s premises to a more radical conclusion: skeptical dogmatism, which is the view that mwhis probably false based on the idea that there are many equipollent competitors to mwh.

Affiliations: 1: New Mexico State University, mwalker@nmsu.edu

10.1163/22105700-04011124
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-04011124
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/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-04011124
2015-08-14
2018-04-23

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