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Effective Skeptical Arguments

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Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios (those that can power a prima facie compelling skeptical argument) all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem for skeptical arguments: they require the KK principle. We respond to this criticism on behalf of the skeptic in our paper.

Affiliations: 1: University of Akron, cb72@uakron.edu; 2: University of California, Santa Barbara brueckne@philosophy.ucsb.edu

10.1163/22105700-04011128
/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-04011128
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1. Murphy P. ( 2013). “ "The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios",” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Vol 3: 271281. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03011096
2. Stroud B. ( 1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism . New York: Oxford University Press.
http://brill.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-04011128
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/content/journals/10.1163/22105700-04011128
2015-12-18
2018-09-19

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